一、主题： Loyalty, Cooperation and Perks: Insider Trading in a Harmonious Society
二、主讲人：朱筠，美国伦斯勒理工学院（Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute）金融学博士，现执教于纽约圣若望大学（St. John’s University）Tobin商学院，副教授（终身）， 并担任Review of Business主编。主要的科研方向为政治经济，金融科技，公司治理及商业伦理等。近期论文发表于Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, The Financial Review, Journal of Empirical Finance等期刊。
Abstract: Based on a comprehensive overview of insider trading and its enforcement in China, this paper explores the relationship between political networks and insider trading. In contrast to Western countries, where political connections encourage insider trading through reducing litigation risk, we find that in China — a “harmonious society” that values loyalty, implicitness, reciprocity, and cooperation — firms with strong political networks are less likely to use insider trading to preserve political favor if it is more lucrative than insider trading. On the other hand, consistent with the literature, when firms do trade on inside information, the information advantages from political connections lead to higher capital gains.